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Abstract A discrete public good is provided when total contributions equal or
exceed the contribution threshold. Recent theoretical work shows that an increase
in threshold uncertainty will increase (decrease) equilibrium contributions when the
public good value is sufficiently high (low). In an experiment designed to test these
predictions, I find only limited verification of the prediction. Using elicited beliefs
data to represent subjects’ beliefs, I find that behavior is not consistent with expected
payoff maximization, however, contributions are increasing in subjects’ subjective
pivotalness. Thus, wider threshold uncertainty will sometimes—but not always—
hinder collective action.
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Many collective action scenarios, such as a multiple plaintiffs raising funds to achieve
a commonly desired judicial ruling, neighborhood residents petitioning a local gov-
ernment to build a public project, and, more dramatically, plotters planning the size of
their attempted coup, can be represented as discrete public good games. Specifically, a
discrete public good is provided if contributions equal or exceed the required threshold
level of contributions; otherwise, no good is provided. Since Olson’s (1965) seminal
work, researchers have examined how a number of factors, such as group size, exclud-
ability, selective incentives, punishment, and so on, inhibit or foster successful public
good provision. One factor that potentially affects individuals’ decisions to participate
in a collective action is uncertainty1 about the threshold level of contributions needed
for successful action.2 In the examples above, the plaintiffs might not know how much
funds will be needed to fund a successful case, the neighborhood residents might not
know how many signatures are needed to get the project built, and the coup plotters
might not know how big their faction needs to be to overthrow the incumbent dictator.
Aware that threshold uncertainty affects an individual’s strategic voluntary contri-
bution decision, Nitzan and Romano (1990) and Suleiman (1997) extended the basic
discrete public good model first studied by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989, 1992) to include threshold uncertainty. They find that threshold
uncertainty often results in inefficient equilibria because ex post excess contributions
might be discarded or because contributions fall short of the threshold in equilibrium.3
More recently, however, McBride (2006) showed that the effect of an increase of uncer-
tainty (as in a mean-preserving spread) on binary contribution decisions depends on
the value of the public good. For example, in the neighborhood resident example
mentioned earlier, suppose it is known exactly how many residents must petition the
government to get the project approved and that the equilibrium outcome under perfect
knowledge of the petition threshold is that enough petitions be made. McBride’s result
implies that if there is an increase in uncertainty about the petition threshold, then the
number of petitions made to the government will actually increase when residents
1 With “ risk” corresponding to known probabilities and “ uncertainty” corresponding to unknown prob-
abilities, the term risk is more appropriate here. However, I use the term uncertainty because the earlier
work (e.g., Nitzan and Romano 1990) used that term.
2 Other types of uncertainty in public good games have also been considered. For example, Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1988) consider uncertainty about others’ degree of altruism; Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991)
consider uncertainty about others’ contribution costs; and Menezes et al. (2001) consider uncertainty about
others’ valuations of the public good. Morevoer, the discrete public good game with threshold uncertainty
is similar to research on common pool resources with unknown pool size, e.g., Budescu et al. (1995).
3 Rebates and refunds may help mitigate some of the inefficiencies. For example, if money is refunded
to contributors when the threshold is not met, then potential contributors do not risk paying for something
and getting nothing in return, and if excess contributions above the threshold are rebated, then the risk of
overpaying may disappear. However, free-rider problems may still exist because an individual still wants
others to pay the costs instead of herself. Moreover, whether or not refunds and rebates resolve inefficiencies
will depend on the way they are designed (e.g., Isaac et al. 1989; Marks and Croson 1998; Spencer et al.
2009). Also, rebates may not be technologically possible depending on the setting. Rebates seem a viable
option if contributions are monetary, but less so if contributions are participatory in time and effort. When
possible, though, they help mitigate some, even if not all, of the hindrances to successful collective action.
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highly value the project. On the other hand, if the project is not sufficiently valued,
the increase in uncertainty will drive the number of petitions to zero.
An individual’s marginal benefit of contributing a unit towards the public good
depends on two things. The first is the value of the public good; as the public good
value increases, so does the marginal benefit of contributing. The second is the prob-
ability that her contribution is pivotal in providing the good. If no refund will be
given for overfunded or underfunded contributions, then an individual will only want
to contribute if the probability that her contribution is pivotal in providing the good
is sufficiently large. Intuitively, if an individual believes total contributions will not
meet the threshold even with her contribution or if the total contributions already meet
or exceed the threshold without her contribution, then she will not contribute. Key
to McBride’s result is that the probability of being pivotal is tied to the uncertainty
about the threshold. As the uncertainty increases, the threshold is less likely to be
some values but more likely to be others, and, the probability of being pivotal for
certain contribution profiles changes accordingly. McBride shows that the probability
of being pivotal increases (decreases) as uncertainty increases when the value of the
public good is high (low), thereby driving up (down) contributions. The implication
of this result is that threshold uncertainty need not inhibit successful provision of a
discrete public good.
This paper presents results from an experiment designed to test this prediction.
Previous experimental work has studied contributions in discrete public good games
(also called step-level public goods, threshold public goods, or provision-point public
goods), e.g., Offerman (1996), and Offerman et al. (1996) (see Ledyard 1995 for an
earlier review of experimental work on public goods). Some of this work has examined
threshold uncertainty. Wit and Wilke (1998) and Au (2004) conducted experiments
with sequential contributions, and they find that contribution levels are lower under
higher threshold uncertainty. Gustafsson, Biel, and Gärling (1998) report a similar find-
ing in an analogous experiment with simultaneous contributions. Suleiman et al. (2001)
find in a simultaneous contributions experiment that the effect of threshold uncertainty
can depend on the mean of the threshold distribution. Unlike these earlier experiments,
the experiment presented here varies the public good value, thereby allowing a test of
the impact of changes in uncertainty at different public good values. The experiment
also elicits subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ contribution levels using a proper
scoring rule. These data allow a closer examination of the subjects’ decision making
process because they can be used to infer a measure of the subjects’ perceived pivotal-
ness. Thus, unlike other experimental work, the experiment performed here can test
McBride’s (2006) prediction about the binary contribution decision.
Overall, the data provide some support, albeit weak, of the prediction. Contribu-
tions often increase as uncertainty increases when the public good value is high and
decrease when the public good value is low. Yet, the prediction is not matched for
every treatment. Thus, I consider two additional questions: why is the prediction
verified to any degree, and why is that level of verification so weak? These ques-
tions can be addressed using the elicited beliefs data. An examination of these data
reveal that subjects do update their reported beliefs in manners consistent with many
learning models. This finding justifies using these data to proxy for subjects’ true
beliefs, which in turn allows me to calculate subjects’ implied subjective probabilities
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of being pivotal. Conditioning on this subjective pivotalness, I show that subjects do
not behave in a manner consistent in all ways with the model’s implied decision rule.
However, contribution behavior is consistent with one key feature of the decision rule:
the likelihood a subject contributes is increasing in the subject’s subjective pivotal-
ness. In short, when making contribution decisions, individuals do act strategically in
that they respond to pivotalness. This implies that even though the model’s prediction
about contribution levels is not strongly verified, the primary conclusion that threshold
uncertainty need not inhibit collective action is supported.
2 Model and predictions
2.1 Model set-up
Consider a set of expected payoff maximizing players N = {1, . . . , n} , 2 < n < ∞.
Players have identical strategy sets Si = {0, 1}. Choosing strategy si = 0 is to be
interpreted as not contributing, while choosing si = 1 implies contributing. The cost
of contributing one unit is c > 0, the value of a provided public good is v > 0, and
both are the same for all individuals. The contribution threshold t to provide the public
good is chosen from a publicly known distribution cdf F with pdf f s.t. F (0) = 0.
Thus, the probability of providing the public good is F(
∑n
j=1 s j ), and i’s expected
payoff given some profile s of contribution choices is ui (s) = F(∑nj=1 s j )v − si c.4
With n, v, c, and F and all of the above commonly known, and assuming the players
make their contribution choices simultaneously, we have a well-defined normal form
game.
2.2 Decision rule and equilibrium
This game will generally have both pure and mixed equilibria. I review only the
pure equilibria here, as the mixed equilibria will exhibit qualitatively similar features
(McBride 2006).
An agent’s decision in equilibrium will depend on her subjective probability of
being pivotal in providing the public good. Denote C−i to be the set of contributing
agents besides i , and also let it denote the number of contributing agents. The payoff
matrix is
C−i < t − 1
(lost cause)
C−i = t − 1
(pivotal)
C−i > t − 1
(redundant)
si = 1 (contribute) −c v − c v − c
si = 0 (not contribute) 0 0 v
4 This can be thought of as transferable utility, where the contributions equal c
∑n
j=1 s j with provision
probability is F(c
∑n
j=1 s j ), and where the units for t are chosen such that we can ignore the c in front of
the summation.
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Let s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn). Further denote Pr[piv|s−i, F] the proba-
bility that i is pivotal given s−i and F, Pr[lost|s−i, F] the probability of a lost cause,
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These probabilities correspond to the likelihoods of the realized contributions equaling
the respective column in the payoff matrix. It is a lost cause from individual i’s point
of view if, conditional on others’ contributions, the public good will not be provided
even if i contributes. Her contribution is redundant if the public good is provided even
if she does not contribute. Her contribution is pivotal if the public good is provided
if she contributes but not provided if she does not contribute.
Given s−i and F , a player is willing to contribute if her expected payoff contributing
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In words: i should contribute if she perceives her chance of being pivotal is greater
than the cost-to-value ratio.
Because the number of contributions in equilibrium is of greater interest than which
players contribute in equilibrium, I will treat two equilibria with the same number of
contributions as one equilibrium. Denote C∗ to be the number of contributors in
equilibrium s∗. Notice that in equilibrium s∗, a contributing player believes with
probability one that exactly C∗ − 1 others are contributing, so that the contributing
player is pivotal with probability f (∑ j =i s∗j + 1), which equals f (C∗). A non-con-
tributing player is pivotal with probability f (C∗ + 1).
Assuming that a player in a pure equilibrium who is indifferent between contribut-
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, x = 2, 3, 4
0 otherwise
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Suppose n = 5. With c
v
= 0.4, as illustrated by the horizontal line at 0.4, we have
f (x) < c
v
for all x . Thus, the only equilibrium has 0 contributions. However,
with c
v′ = 0.2, as illustrated by the lower horizontal line, we have f (0) < 0.2 andf (4) > 0.2 > f (5). In this case, there are two equilibria: a trivial one with 0
contributions and a non-trivial one with 4 contributions.
2.3 Changes in uncertainty
A key feature to notice is that an equilibrium with an interior contribution level (strictly
between 0 and n) is located where the pdf is downward sloping and crosses the c
v
-line.
In Fig. 1a with c
v
< 13 , this occurs at C
∗ = 4. A second key feature is that if the pdf
is uniform as in Fig. 1a or unimodal (single peaked) as in Fig. 1b, then there is only
one such crossing.
These two features allow us to examine what happens as uncertainty changes.
Consider Fig. 1c, which depicts the three different uniform pdfs that I use in my
experiment. The solid black pdf is f from Fig. 1a. The white pdf f ′ is
f ′ (x) =
{
1, x = 3
0 otherwise.
This represents the case of the least amount of uncertainty (i.e., perfect certainty of t).
The gray pdf f ′′ is






, x = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
0 otherwise.
Among these three pdfs, f ′′ has the most uncertainty.
If c
v
= 0.45, then the unique non-trivial equilibrium under f ′ is C∗ = 3. If uncer-
tainty increases to f , then the unique equilibrium has no contributions. In this case,
an increase in uncertainty eliminates all contributions. If instead c
v
= 0.3, due to a
higher valuation of the public good, then the unique non-trivial equilibrium under f ′
is still C∗ = 3, but now there is a unique non-trivial equilibrium C∗ = 4 under f .
In this case, equilibrium contributions are actually higher under the wider uncertainty.
Why does this happen? Remember that the marginal value of a contribution depends
on both the public good value and on the probability of being pivotal. If the product
of these two factors is sufficiently high, then contributing is optimal. An increase in
threshold uncertainty changes the probability of being pivotal: it decreases it for some
contribution profiles but increases it for others. But what matters for the contribution
decision is whether or not the product of pivotalness probability and public good value
is sufficiently high, and a property of the equilibrium is that an increase in threshold
uncertainty always (weakly) increases the probability of being pivotal when the public
good is sufficiently high.5
5 Graphically, as uncertainty increases, the peak of the pdf drops but the tails of the pdf rise. If the cv -line is
sufficiently low, then it will cross the wider-uncertainty pdf in the fatter tail, and equilibrium contributions
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Figure 1c provides another example of this logic. As uncertainty changes from f ′ to
f with c
v
= 0.3, then contributions increase. But now if uncertainty further increases
from f to f ′′, still keeping c
v
= 0.3, then the equilibrium contributions decrease
to 0 because the c
v
-line is now entirely above the pdf. If instead c
v
= 0.15, then
each increase in uncertainty from f ′ to f to f ′′ results in an increase in equilibrium
contributions from 3 to 4 to 5.
I summarize by stating the primary prediction I will test in the laboratory
experiment:
Prediction: If v is sufficiently large ( c
v
sufficiently small), then an increase in
threshold uncertainty will lead to an increase in contributions. But if v is suf-
ficiently small, then an increase in threshold uncertainty will lead to a decrease
in contributions.
3 Experimental design
This experiment was conducted at the California Social Science Experimental Labo-
ratory located on the campus of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).
All subjects are drawn from the UCLA student population. Each experimental session
consisted of 4 practice rounds and 30 real rounds,6 and each session had either 25 or
30 students. All decisions were made over a computer network in a computer currency
called “tokens.” Subjects amassed tokens depending on the decisions and the factors
determined by the computer. At the end of the session, subjects were paid US dollars
according to a pre-announced token/dollar exchange rate.
In each round, the computer randomly and anonymously assigns the subjects into
groups of five, and each subject is given one computer token. Each subject’s computer
then displays the public good value and the threshold distribution. Instead of using
the term “threshold distribution,” subjects are told that the threshold distribution is a
range T = {t, . . . , t} from which the computer will randomly and uniformly select
the true threshold. Subjects are told that the “threshold-met value” and “threshold
range” are the same for all individuals and groups in the room.
Before deciding whether to keep (do not contribute) or spend (contribute) the one
given token, each subject is asked to assign percentage probabilities to what the others
in his or her group will do. Since each group has five subjects, each subject assigns
probabilities to the following five events: exactly 0 others in the group spend, exactly
1 other spends, exactly 2 others spend, exactly 3 others spend, and exactly 4 others
spend. Once the assigned percentages add up to 100 percent and the subject confirms
the entry, the subject then makes the decision to keep or spend the one token. Tokens
not spent in the current round cannot be spent in later rounds. Subjects are not allowed
to communicate with any other subjects in the room during the practice or real rounds.
Footnote 5 continued
will thus be higher. Put differently, the equilibrium probability of being pivotal has increased and so
contributions increase. On the other hand, if the cv -line is too high so that it is above the peak of the
wider-uncertainty pdf, then contributions will plummet.
6 The exception is the 8/21 session which ended after 26 rounds.
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A subject’s payment for a given round has two parts. The first payment is based
on the accuracy of the reported beliefs, which is derived using a proper scoring rule.




[bit (actualt)]2 − 12
(





where bit (e) , e = 0, . . . , 4, is the percent assigned by i to the event that e others
spend, and bit (actualt) is the percent assigned to that x that actually occurs. The
highest this payment can be in a given round is v2 , and the lowest is 0. The second
payment in a given round is that resulting from the contribution decisions. Letting C
be the total realized contributions in the group, this payment for subject i is:
v + 1 if C ≥ t and si = 0
v if C ≥ t and si = 1
1 if C < t and si = 0
0 if C < t and si = 1.
I consider five different value-threshold range (v, T ) combinations,
(3, {3}), (3, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
(6, {3}), (6, {2, 3, 4}) , (6, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}),
in a variety of different treatments. While v was held fixed in each session, T var-
ied in some sessions. Whenever the range was changed, it was fixed for the first 15
rounds, then changed to another range, which was then held fixed for the rest of the
session. Table 1a lists the expected equilibrium contribution levels under the dif-
ferent (v, T )-combinations assuming expected payoff maximization as in the model.
It also lists the qualitative predictions: equilibrium contributions should be higher
under (3, {3}) than (3, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}), and they should be successively higher under
(6, {3}), (6, {2, 3, 4}), and (6, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). Table 1b lists the different treatments
and the number of sessions per treatment. As stated earlier, these threshold ranges
correspond to the distributions in Fig. 1c. Given the limited budget, a choice had to
be made about which treatments to run. Because decreased contributions under wider
uncertainty seems the more intuitive prediction, more sessions were run with v = 6 as
it is this treatment with the less intuitive prediction that contributions increase under
wider uncertainty.
This design allows for testing the theoretical predictions. This basic set-up, includ-
ing n = 5 and uniform threshold range, matches that used in the previous experimental
studies of threshold uncertainty mentioned earlier. This establishes continuity with
the other studies. The uniform threshold range is the best way to model the threshold
distribution since subjects understand a uniform distribution. The uniform threshold
range also implies single-crossing for both pure and symmetric equilibria, and this
single-crossing implies nice qualitative predictions of contribution movements with
changes in uncertainty. The chosen parameters profiles will allow for high and low
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Table 1 Treatment and session descriptions
(a) Proportion of contributions by parameter combinations
v = 3 v = 6
T = {3} T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} T = {3} T = {2, 3, 4} T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Pure equlibrium 3 0 3 4 5
Qualitative prediction Decrease→ Increase→
(b) Treatments and sessions
Treatment Number of sessions
(3,{3}) to (3,{1,2,3,4,5})a 1
(6,{3}) to (6,{2,3,4})a 1
(6,{2,3,4}) to (6,{3})a 1
(6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5})a 3




a When the threshold range switches, the first 15, the rounds are under the first range, and the rounds are
under the second range
v and for high and low uncertainty. Data for all these scenarios are needed to com-
pare with the predictions. Eliciting beliefs will allow for more direct testing of the
underlying behavior of the subjects, and providing incentives to report true beliefs
adds credibility to the beliefs data.7 Group sizes are held constant to remove the
effects of group sizes on contribution levels. No information on others’ decisions or
payments is given and all decisions are made privately to remove social pressures or
social comparisons that might affect behavior.8 The maximum payment for beliefs
is half as much as the highest payment from the keep/spend decision. This should
remove the motive for players to play a game that maximizes the beliefs payment.
Finally, I emphasize that the measure of pivotalness used in the analysis below
refers to inferred pivotalness and not actual pivotalness. First, subjects cannot know
their exact probability of being pivotal because they cannot know for sure ex ante
exactly how many other contributions will be made. Second, subjects were not asked
the likelihood of being pivotal. They were asked to report probabilities about possible
outcomes, and then I infer a subjective probability of being pivotal from these elicited
beliefs.
7 See Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Hurley and Shogren (2005) for extended discussion on the benefits
of using elicted beliefs data. I am not the first to use elicted beliefs data in public goods experiments (see
Offerman 1996 and Offerman et al. 1996).
8 Subjects are in a large room sitting at computer terminals. During the instructional phase of the experi-
ment but before choices are made, the subjects are prompted to pull out dividers that make it impossible for
one subject to observe another’s computer screen without standing up and disrupting the experiment. This
never happened, so privacy was maintained. Such dividers are commonly used in laboratory experiments
to foster privacy.
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Table 2 Contribution means
(a) Average contributions/round by (v ,T )-combination
v = 3 v = 6
T = {3} T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} T = {3} T = {2, 3, 4} T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
All sessions and rounds 2.70 (375) 2.50 (375) 3.44 (3525) 3.48 (3225) 3.49 (4080)
(observations)
All sessions and rounds 8+ 2.67 (200) 2.30 (200) 3.43 (2090) 3.45 (2280) 3.56 (2680)
(observations)
(b) Contribution means by session and (v, T )-combination for rounds 8+
1. (3,{3}) to (3,{1,2,3,45}) 2.68 2.30
2. (6,{3}) to (6,{2,3,4}) 3.03 3.28
3. (6,{2,3,4}) to (6,{3}) 3.38 3.61
4. (6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) 3.67 3.75
5. (6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) 3.54 3.44
6. (6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) 3.19 2.88









Findings 1–4 summarize the main results.
Finding 1 The prediction concerning contribution levels under different (v, T )-com-
binations is only moderately verified.
Table 2a lists the contribution levels by (v, T )-combination by all rounds and for
rounds 8 and higher. The quantitative contribution levels differ substantially from
the mixed equilibrium contribution levels in all case. However, when v = 3, con-
tributions are higher under T = {3} than under T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} as qualitatively
predicted by the model. In the later rounds where the predictions may be more likely
to be verified (e.g., due to convergence to an equilibrium), contributions are over 7
percent higher. This difference is only weakly significant; a test of equal means
gives a test statistic9 of 1.50. This weakly significant test statistic may be due to
9 The t-statistic for testing the equality of two means px and py is
Z = p̂x − p̂y√





where p0 = px nx +py nynx +ny (Newbold 1995, 360).
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the small sample size for v = 3. When v = 6, contribution levels are higher under
wider uncertainty as predicted, although the differences in levels vary depending on
the comparison and are sometimes quite small. The difference between contributions
under {3} and {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (test statistic 1.92) and between {2, 3, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
(test statistic 1.72) are moderately significant. Contributions under {3} and {2, 3, 4}
do not statistically differ (test statistic 0.30). Unlike for the v = 3 case, the sample
sizes are quite large for these v = 6 comparisons.
Table 2b further breaks down contribution levels in the later rounds by session.
Contribution means vary widely across sessions—even when under the same (v, T )-
combination. Of the 7 sessions with multiple threshold ranges, contribution levels
differ in the predicted manner in 4 and differ opposite of the predicted manner in
3.10 In the sessions where the range never changed, we again both match and do not
match the predictions. As predicted, contributions under {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} sessions are
always higher than under {3} and {2, 3, 4}, but contributions in the single {3}-session
are slightly higher than under the three {2, 3, 4}-sessions.
In short, aggregated contribution levels under the various (v, T )-combinations dif-
fer qualitatively as expected in some cases but not all, and this verification is moderate
at best. Figure 2 provides visual support for this conclusion. As predicted for the low
value case, there does appear to be a clear downward trend in contributions in Session
1 (Fig. 2a) after uncertainty increases (signified by the vertical dotted line) at the start
of round 16. However, upward or downward trends after the change in uncertainty
are harder to spot visually within Sessions 2 through 7. The visual comparison across
Sessions 8 through 14, which did not have changes in uncertainty, entails looking at
levels across sessions. Again, it is difficult to tell visually that contributions are higher
in one session than another. That said, the stronger result for Session 1 is likely due to
the fact that the equilibrium prediction under the low public good value matches the
naive guess that wider uncertainty hurts contributions. Under the high public good
value, equilibrium pivotalness works against the naive intuition.
Because the verification of the prediction is moderate at best, two questions follow:
why are the predictions verified to any degree, and why are they not verified to a larger
degree? While there are many possible reasons, such as heterogeneity in subjects’
innate cooperativeness (Burlando and Guala 2005), I explore these questions using
the data on subjects’ elicited beliefs. This allows me to focus directly on the strate-
gic nature of the decision as it relates to pivotalness. Finding 2 provides additional
justification for the use of my particular data.
Finding 2 The reported beliefs move in manners consistent with beliefs-updating.
Let bit = ∑n−1e=0 ebit (e) be the mean of i’s reported beliefs in period t . Although
subjects are randomly matched in each round, it is likely that subjects use contribution
levels of the prior rounds to help predict what current group members will contribute.
In this case, bit will be closer to what happened in t − 1 than bit−1. It will also be
true that the probability assigned in t to the event that occurred in t − 1 will be higher
10 In practice, the sessions within which the threshold range changes are the better ones to look at for
testing my hypothesis because, as Camerer (1995) explains, the presence of individual, group, or session
effects makes comparison across sessions more problematic.
123
Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study 89




































1: (3,{3}) to (3,{1,2,3,4,5})






1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
















2: (6,{3}) to (6,{2,3,4}) 3: (6,{2,3,4}) to (6,{3})
4: (6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) 5: (6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5})
6: (6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) 7: (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) to (6,{3})









1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
































9: (6,{2,3,4}) 10: (6,{2,3,4}) 11: (6,{2,3,4})























than the probability assigned to that event in t − 1 (e.g., if i assigned 30 percent to 3
others spending in t − 1 and 3 others spent in t − 1 then i should assign 30 percent or
more to 3 others spending in t).
Table 3a lists how frequently reported beliefs moved in these two manners for each
session. The first round of a particular parameter profile is not included in the calcu-
lation of this percentage. The averages moved as expected between 72 percent and
79 percent of the time across the sessions, and 75 percent overall. Subjects (weakly)
123
Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study 91
Table 3 Measures of reported beliefs movements
(a) Proportion of time reported beliefs moved in direction indicative of beliefs updating
% of time reported
beliefs average moved
towards last actual
% of time assigned
higher percent to last
actual
overall rounds 8+ 0.75 0.82
0.76 0.82
1. (3,{3}) to (3,{1,2,3,45}) 0.76 0.79
2. (6,{3}) to (6,{2,3,4}) 0.76 0.85
3. (6,{2,3,4}) to (6,{3}) 0.79 0.85
4. (6,{3}) to (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) 0.78 0.83
5. 0.73 0.81
6. 0.78 0.80
7. (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) to (6,{3}) 0.79 0.85
8. (6,{3}) 0.77 0.82
9. (6,{2,3,4}) 0.75 0.82
10. 0.75 0.82
11. 0.74 0.81
12. (6,{1,2,3,4,5}) 0.75 0.82
13. 0.73 0.78
14. 0.77 0.85
(b) Regressions of mean beliefs on various controls (standard errors in parentheses)
OLS 1st AR(1) 2nd AR(1)
Intercept 0.45 (0.018) 0.26 (0.016) 0.26 (0.028)
Mean belief t−1 0.83 (0.006) 0.90 (0.006) 0.89 (0.010)
Actual t−1−mean belief t−1 0.13 (0.004) 0.12 (0.003) 0.19 (0.006)
Parameter round – – 0.00 (0.002)
(Mean belief t−1) – – 0.00 (0.001)
(parameter round)
(Actual t−1− mean belief t−1) – – –0.01 (0.000)
(parameter round)
R2 0.61 0.63 0.63
Durbin-Watson 2.28 – –
increased the probability placed on the last period’s event between 78 percent and 85
percent of the time, and about 82 percent overall.11
Table 3b presents estimates from regressions of bit on different control variables.
OLS regressions suffer from two potential problems. First, bit is bounded between
0 and 4. Examination of the data reveals that of the 10,990 lagged observations only
132 observations had bit = 4, 6 had bit = 0, and one had incorrectly imputed values
for bit . Removing these 139 observations (less than 1.5 percent of the data) leaves
11 Offerman et al. (2001) report similar findings regarding elicted beliefs in their study.
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10,851 observations, and regressions on these data should not suffer from inconsisten-
cies that could result from the censoring. The first estimates listed are from an OLS




using this reduced set
of observations. All estimates have the expected signs and are highly significant.
A second problem is that OLS does not account for possible autocorrelation, and
the standard Durbin-Watson test indicates the presence of negative autocorrelation, as
evidenced by a test statistic significantly different than 2. Autocorrelation is detected
even though this statistic should be biased towards 2 because of the lagged dependent
variable.12 Table 3b presents results from two different 1st-degree autoregressions.
The first AR(1) gives results similar to the OLS results. The second AR(1) includes
more control variables that capture how beliefs-updating might differ in later rounds.
The R2 values over 60 percent indicate that a significant amount of the mean beliefs
can be explained by the regressors used. We observe that adding additional controls
to the parsimonious specification does not add much explanatory power.
Finding 2 suggests that reported beliefs reflect the subjects’ true beliefs. I also
note that the computer interface did not list the subject’s beliefs reports from prior
rounds (it only lists contribution decisions and payments) when subjects report their
beliefs in the current round. Thus, it appears that subjects’ reported beliefs do reflect
internalized beliefs since they are related from round to round without being listed on
the computer screen.
With the use of these data now justified, I can combine the reported beliefs with the
threshold distribution probabilities to directly calculate each i ’s subjective probability




] = bit (0) Pr [t = 1|T ] + · · · + bit (4) Pr [t = 5|T ] .
Because the theoretical decision rule depends on a player’s subjective beliefs about
others’ contributions, I can now use the reported beliefs to ascertain how closely the






and do not contribute otherwise.
Finding 3 Letting reported beliefs proxy for true beliefs, subjects’ actions are not
consistent with expected payoff maximization.
Table 4 details how frequently subjects’ contributions matched this decision rule.
65 percent of all decisions are consistent with expected payoff maximization.13 Only
about 1 percent more are consistent in rounds 8 and higher. Note that deviations from
the decision rule differ across sessions and (v, T )-combinations, with 55 percent to 80
percent consistent across sessions and 50 percent to 70 percent across (v, T )-combi-
nations. When v = 6 and the decision rule says “ should not” contribute, then subjects
are more likely to contribute, whereas when v = 3 and the rule says “ should not” ,
then subjects are more likely to not contribute. These percentages are similar to the
approximately two-thirds of subjects found to act consistently with expected payoff
12 See Chapter 13 in Greene (1997) for a discussion of autocorrelation and autocorrelation tests.
13 This calculation uses all observations except the one with the incorrectly reported beliefs, thus leaving
a total of 9,629 observations.
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maximization by Offerman et al. (1996). Further observe that wider uncertainty alone
does not drive the percentage consistent up or down. When v = 3, fewer decisions
are consistent with expected payoff maximization, while more are consistent when
v = 6. One plausible explanation is that an expected payoff calculation made by a
subject in the wide uncertainty case with v = 3 is much harder to make than under
wide uncertainty with v = 6. Yet, there is no way to confirm this conjecture using the
data.
Finding 3 thus provides an initial answer to the second question posed above: the
predictions are not strongly verified because subjects are not following the model’s
decision rule. The next finding suggests why the predictions are verified to any degree.
Finding 4 Subjects are more likely to contribute when they believe they are more
likely to be pivotal.









. I use the Epanechnikov kernel in the Nadaray-
Watson kernel estimator under three different smoothing bandwidth parameters




x ranges from −0.333 to 0.833 in the data, this estimator is






































The curve labeled “EP Decision Rule” depicts the model’s game theoretic decision
rule. Figure 3b plots the h = 0.1 fit with 95 percent confidence intervals.15 The first
thing to note is that subjects are more likely to contribute than not contribute even
at many negative values of (Pr[piv|bit, F] − cv ). This provides further evidence for
rejecting the consistency of observed actions with the model’s expected payoff max-
imization decision rule. Nonetheless, while expected payoff maximization is clearly
rejected, note that Fig. 3a also reveals that the likelihood of contributing increases in
(Pr[piv|bit, F]− cv ). The slope of the non-parametric fit is positive, with the estimated
probability of contributing increasing from below 0.5 at (Pr[piv|bit, F] − cv ) = −0.4
to about 0.75 at high values of (Pr[piv|bit, F] − cv ).
14 A smaller bandwidth parameter implies that the only observations to receive weight are those closer
to the point being estimated. While a smaller bandwidth implies greater precision in the sense of putting
more weight on the more appropriate observations, if the bandwidth parameter is too small, then too few
observations will given weight. By trial and error, I found h = 0.025 to be the smallest bandwidth that still
includes a meaningful number of observations for most point estimates.
15 To obtain better confidence intervals, I should compute bootstrap interval estimates. For statistical ease,
however, I use the approximate confidence interval described by Härdle (1990), (100–101). The interval
is mh(x) ± (cαc1/2K σ̂ (x))/
√
(nh f̂ (x)), where cα is the 100 − α quantile of the normal distribution, c1/2K
is a kernel constant, σ̂ (x) is the estimate of the standard deviation, and f̂ (x) is the estimate of the density.
This confidence interval is hampered by a bias, but as we see from the graph, the bias must be large for




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 3 Non-parametric regressions; a non-parametric EP regressions with h = 0.025, 0.1, 0.15;
b non-parametric EP regressions with 95% confidence interval for h = 0.1
Overall, the subjects’ actual decision rules and the model’s decision rule have an
important qualitative similarity and an important difference. The similarity is that
subjects appear to strategically consider their pivotalness when making contribution
decisions. Because pivotalness is strategic in the sense that it depends on a subject’s
beliefs about others’ actions (in all cases except T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}), subjects are
playing strategically in a game theoretic sense. Moreover, they are responding to
pivotalness even in the presence of threshold uncertainty. Thus, the model captures
an important aspect of the subjects’ strategic behavior. This finding is particularly
striking since subjects were not directly asked to report a probability of being pivotal.
Had I asked them directly what the chances were that their own contribution was
necessary to meet the threshold, then it is likely that this direct report of pivotalness
would factor more heavily into their contribution decision, since directly asking them
about pivotalness could unintentionally lead them to believe that pivotalness should
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determine the contribution decision. The fact that the inferred subjective pivotalness
does matter suggests that subjects consider their pivotalness of their own volition.
However, the main difference between actual behavior and the model is that sub-
jects do not respond as sharply to pivotalness around the cutpoint c
v
as implied by the
model. When near the cutpoint, an increase in pivotalness only marginally increases
the (global) probability of contribution. This offers one explanation for why contri-
butions under T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} were lower than under T = {3} in sessions 5, 6,
and 7. When T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, a contributor’s probability of being pivotal is 15
no matter what she thinks others will do. When T = {3}, the probability of being
pivotal is the probability assigned to the event that exactly two others contribute. If
this probability is greater than 15 , which will often be the case, and if players use a best
response rule that is strictly monotonically increasing in (Pr[piv|bit, F]− cv ) (as in the
non-parametrically estimated function in Fig. 3), then we will see more contributions
under T = {3} than T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. More generally, if contributions depend not
just on whether Pr[piv|bit, F] is greater than cv but also on the difference between the
two, then we will observe deviations from the model’s predictions.
Why do subjects not follow the expected payoff maximization rule more closely?
Though answering this question is not a purpose of this study, I can offer some possi-
ble answers. First, some subjects may not perfectly understand the decision making
environment despite the efforts to teach them during the practice rounds. Second,
subjects may be acting consistently but with preferences that are risk averse or risk
loving. Third, subjects may have some form of other-regarding preferences. There
could be still other explanations. As mentioned below, investigating these possibilities
constitutes an important direction for future research.
5 Discussion
The theoretical results indicate that for highly valued public goods a widening of
threshold uncertainty will increase individuals’ probabilities of being pivotal, thereby
driving up contributions. The experimental results provide only moderate support for
these predictions. A widening of uncertainty often, but not always, results in move-
ments in contributions in the expected manner. Although the subjects relate changes
in threshold uncertainty into changes in pivotalness and consider pivotalness when
making contribution decisions, they do not respond to pivotalness as sharply as the
model implies. These last findings are obtained using data on subjects’ subjective
beliefs about other subjects’ contributions.
The main implication of these findings is that whether or not threshold uncer-
tainty hinders collective action will depend on the size of the benefits resulting from
successful action and also on how individuals respond to pivotalness. Increases in
threshold uncertainty may actually increase the likelihood of successful action when
the benefits of successful collective action are large. However, because individuals
do not respond to pivotalness to the degree implied by the model, this might only
occur under small levels of threshold uncertainty. Threshold uncertainty will almost
certainly hinder collective action when the value of the public good is low because
wider uncertainty in this setting will lower individuals’ probabilities of being pivotal.
123
Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study 97
The risk of participating in a lost cause or of making a redundant contribution is then
too high relative to the small potential gains.
It follows that groups facing threshold uncertainty will often need to undertake
costly actions for collective action to succeed. One possibility would be the creation
of mechanisms that exclude or punish non-participants. Another possibility, more in
the spirit of this paper, would be the costly gathering of information that would reduce
the variance in people’s beliefs about the threshold, and this in turn raises a number of
other strategic issues. For example, a group may actually prefer to not collect more
information about the threshold if it is believed doing so will reduce the uncertainty
so much that contributions will decrease. Also, a group leader with more precise
information about the threshold may strategically reveal or not reveal her information
in an attempt to obtain any surplus that can arise from contributions.
Future research should examine threshold uncertainty in these and other settings.
Theoretical work should examine settings where individuals have private signals about
the threshold, and an extension would allow some of those individuals to have noisier
signals than others. Another setting would have a group leader who must choose
whether or not to initiate costly information gathering. By examining these settings
we can better understand how individuals’ incentives to gather and share informa-
tion differ across informational environments. Since much collective action occurs
within formal groups or in the presence of other institutions, such work will lend
insights into the actions taken by these groups to overcome the effects of threshold
uncertainty.
A different direction of research should focus more closely on individuals’ contri-
bution decisions. That individuals do not respond as sharply to pivotalness suggests
the presence of other strategic or behavioral factors in the decision making process.
Prior research suggests a number of possibilities, e.g., that individuals differ in risk
attitudes, dynamic strategic play, and learning. An alternative explanation is that
subjects care about collective efficacy in addition to or instead of self efficacy (Kerr
1989; Lewinsohn-Zamir 1998). Examination of the experimental data reveals that
subjects were less fearful of making redundant contributions (contributing to a near
“sure thing”) than contributing to a lost cause. This behavior could be evidence of
collective efficacy concerns or risk aversion. Nonetheless, future work should account
for these possibilities to better explain the observed behavior.16
Finally, more work should be done on reported beliefs. The very act of report-
ing beliefs can potentially lead a subject to act differently than if the beliefs were
not reported. Measuring the extent of this possible bias would be useful as it would
lend insights into possible biases in the beliefs data. These avenues of research will
ultimately lead us to a more complete understanding of collective action.
16 This direction of research appears very promising. In preliminary work along these lines, I find evidence
of statistically significant heterogeneity across individuals. While the simple expected payoff maximiza-
tion rule is consistent with only 65 percent of decisions (Table 4), accounting for individual fixed effects in
probit regressions yield esimates that correctly predict over 80 percent of decisions. Moreover, using a grid
procedure to estimate risk aversion and cooperation bias parameters yields estimates that correctly predict
about 90 percent of decisions. Another line of research would look at the presence of dynamic strategies.
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